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Abstract
An eﬀective solution to the problem of runway incursions is long overdue. To date, an average of a thousand incursions
are registered yearly in the United States alone, with similar ﬁgures registed in Europe. Installing a system on-board
aircraft capable of providing an alert in the case of a runway incursion has the potential of signiﬁcantly reducing this.
As with any conﬂict detection and alerting system, the diﬃculty lies in the ﬁne-tuning of the parameters which deﬁne a
conﬂict, in eﬀect resulting in ﬁnding the right trade-oﬀ between false and missed detections and associated alerts. This
is an important consideration in the design of any conﬂict detection system and is key in the context of runway incursion
alerting where aircraft would be travelling at high speed and in close proximity of eachother. This paper addresses this
problem by providing an assessement on the eﬀects of false and missed detections in the event of a runway incursion and
provides mathematical tools for tuning the conﬂict detection boundaries.
1. Introduction
Runway incursions have been a major concern in the
aviation industry for several years and this has resulted
in numerous initiatives to mitigate the risk of incur-
sion, within both Europe and the United States. These
range from awareness campaigns and improved sig-
nage, to air traﬃc control alerting tools that are used
to advise the air traﬃc controller of a runway incur-
sion. Whilst these initiatives have undoubtedly pro-
vided improved levels of safety and contributed to the
reduction in the number of incidents, up to now, they
have not provided satisfactory mitigation to the prob-
lem. This is evidenced by the fact that, to date, the
United States National Transportation Safety Board
still keeps the topic of runway incursions on its top
ten most wanted safety improvements list [1].
There have been a number of programmes dealing
with the design of systems for airﬁeld surveillance with
the capability of detecting conﬂicting situations on-
board the aircraft and generating a corresponding alert
in the cockpit [2, 3, 4]. One of the biggest challenges,
however, is to reliably detect a runway conﬂict, given
the uncertainties inherent to the ownship and traf-
ﬁc data. Although the general technique to runway
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conﬂict detection available in the literature has been
shown to be valid, this paper addresses a study carried
out to determine the impact data uncertainty has on
the positioning of the detection threshold.
2. Runway Conﬂict Detection
When an aircraft is cleared to make use of a runway
for take-oﬀ or landing, the designated runway is essen-
tially reserved for sole use by that aircraft. Any other
aircraft or vehicle entering this reserved area results in
a runway incursion. This is similar to the concept of a
‘protected zone’ or no transgression zone (NTZ) sur-
rounding an aircraft whilst airborne, which deﬁnes a
region into which no other entity must enter to ensure
safety of the ﬂight. In a similar way, the protected
zone of an aircraft during runway manoeuvres is, ac-
tually, the entirety of the runway, extended in length
and width such that it includes traﬃc approaching the
runway for landing and those approaching the runway
through taxiways (Figure 1). Whilst this technique
functions well with accurate aircraft positional data,
it is susceptible to the generation of false alerts when
positional errors such as those introduced by positional
reporting uncertainties are present. For example, with
a detection treshold set just at the taxiway hold-short
bars, an aircraft holding short just before the bar could
trigger a detection (and alert) if it transmits its posi-
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tion as being beyond the bar. This would constitute
the generation of a false alert. On the other hand,
setting the conﬂict detection boundary closer towards
the runway, such as at the runway shoulder, although
reducing false events would have the eﬀect of delaying
the issue of an alert in the case where a runway incur-
sion does occur. A carefull trade-oﬀ between the two
is therefore required.
Figure 1. The protected zone described around the
active runway which deﬁnes the region reserved for
the ownship whilst performing a take-oﬀ or landing
manoeuvre. (Not to scale).
2.1. Trading-oﬀ False for Delayed Detections
The trade-oﬀ between the probability of missed or
delayed detection P(MD) and that of a false detection
P(FD) requires very careful consideration. With the
intended role of such a conﬂict detection system being
that of a safety-net function, the trade-oﬀ is biased
towards maintaining a low false detection rate. The
eﬀect of false detections is most serious during take-
oﬀ. Falsely alerting of a runway conﬂict can lead to an
unnecessary rejected take-oﬀ (RTO) that could have
major or hazardous consequences. This is particularly
so if the RTO is initiated at high speed (close to V1)
where, apart from the risk of brake ﬁre and tyre failure,
there is only a 50% chance of bringing the aircraft to
a halt within the distance allowed. In ﬁeld limited
runways, therefore, a high speed RTO could lead to
an overrun. Consequently the P(FD) during the latter
part of the take-oﬀ run (typically above 80 or 100kts)
must be maintained below 10−7 to be in compliance
with the philosophy of AMC-25.1309 in CS-25 [5]. An
unnecessary low speed RTO, although not as serious
as a high speed RTO, is disruptive and is of nuisance
since it requires the aircraft to taxi back to the start of
the runway, join the queue of aircraft waiting to depart
and allow suﬃcient time for the brakes to cool. Such
an occurrence would invariably aﬀect scheduling and
induce delays.
False alerting during landing is also undesirable.
However, unlike in take-oﬀ, where an unnecessary
abort will have a relatively higher impact on safety,
the main eﬀect of unnecessary go-arounds is of a nui-
sance level, as this would usually only result in a delay
in the ﬂight and the inconvenience of needing to, where
relevant, join an airborne queue to land. Nevertheless,
unnecessary alerts would still lead to loss of conﬁdence
in the system with the possibility of crews disregard-
ing the alert when a runway conﬂict really occurs. A
further consideration is that, in certain circumstances,
an unnecessary go-around may actually compromise
safety and even lead to an accident. The presence of
obstacles and high terrain in the vicinity of the air-
ﬁeld, bad weather (in particular with the presence of
thunderstorm cells), conditions of low fuel and other
contributing eﬀects may combine to signiﬁcantly raise
the risk of accident following a missed approach.
To achieve a low false detection rate, the conﬂict
boundaries need to be carefully placed so that they
can handle errors in state data without causing false
detections at a rate higher than acceptable. However,
the positioning of the boundary also aﬀects the missed
detection rate. Within the context of runway conﬂict
detection, this results in a degradation in the alerting
performance of the system, where, as the aircraft in
conﬂict proceeds within the protected zone, a missed
alert is expressed as a delay in detection. This will
aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of the system in successfully
mitigating conﬂicts. This however will not mean that
the role of the system is not achieved. Indeed, even
if, through late detection the system would be able to
lead to the successful resolution of the conﬂict on only
50% of events, this will translate to a 100% improve-
ment in the mitigation of the risk of runway collisions.
Therefore, the trade-oﬀ between false and missed de-
tections is that of reducing the false detection rate to
an acceptably low level at the expense of late detec-
tion. This ensures that the improvement in safety in-
troduced by the system is not compromised by false
alerts and their associated unnecessary manoeuvres.
As a means to mitigate this problem, two techniques
have been developed. The ﬁrst involves withdrawing
the alerting threshold just enough that an acceptable
false detection rate due to the residual state uncer-
tainty is achieved, without introducing an excessive
delay in detection and alerting. The second technique
involves a prediction of whether an aircraft taxiing to-
wards the runway will not stop before crossing it. This,
performed through an analysis of the aircraft’s speed
and acceleration proﬁles, further improves the early
warning of an incursion and aleviates the delay intro-
duced in alerting due to the withdrawal of the alert-
ing treshold for the purpose of controlling false detec-
tions. It is relevant to note that in runway conﬂicts,
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even a one second diﬀerence can diﬀerentiate between
a collision or a successful avoidance of the conﬂict, un-
derlining the impact this technique could have on the
eﬀectiveness of a runway collision avoidance system.
3. Tuning the Conﬂict Detection Boundary
The width W of the protected zone aﬀects the sen-
sitivity of the detection algorithm to traﬃc intruding
laterally into the zone (along the Y axis). When the
runway is cleared for use by an aircraft in take-oﬀ or
landing, procedure dictates that no traﬃc entity is to
enter the runway and must therefore hold-short at the
runway stop-bars. Choosing W2 to be the distance Ss
of the hold-short bars from the centreline of the run-
way is the theoretically ideal solution as it correctly
maps the actual protection zone generated by proce-
dure. This is a conservative approach, since when an
aircraft crosses the hold-short bar, there still remains a
buﬀer distance (the distance of the hold-short bar from
the runway shoulder) before the aircraft actually en-
ters the runway. However, choosing the zone to extend
exactly to the hold-short bars may result in a high false
detection rate due to the residual uncertainties in the
ﬁltered traﬃc positional states. False detections are
expected to be generated by aircraft correctly holding
at the hold-short bar but are erroneously reported as
being beyond the bar.
The lateral distance S⊥ between the reported traﬃc
position and the runway centreline, being GPS-derived
exhibits noise having a Gaussian distribution.This can
be deﬁned by:
S⊥ ∼ N(s⊥, σ2py ) (1)
where s⊥ is the mean perpendicular distance and σ2py
is the variance of the reported traﬃc position in the Y
direction2.
Therefore, when aircraft stops exactly at the hold
short bar, there is a 50% expectancy that the reported
position of the aircraft falls beyond the threshold, er-
roneously triggering a conﬂict. This is inadequate
and in order to reduce this probability, the threshold
(width) of the protected zone needs to be displaced
away from the hold-short bar as show in Figure 2.
With the threshold set to Ss − 5σpy , a false detec-
tion rate P(FD) of 2.9 × 10−7 for aircraft positioned
exactly at the hold-short bar can be expected, being
in compliance with the AMC-25.1309 philosophy pre-
viously explained. However in reality, aircraft tend
to stop before even reaching the hold-short bar, which
means that the shift in the detection boundary of 5σpy
is conservative and a lower false detection rate would
actually be achieved.
2The reported traﬃc position is strictly reported at the aircraft’s
centre of gravity. However, for this analysis it is assumed to be
referenced to the nose of the aircraft.
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Figure 2. Shifting in the protected zone detection
boundary to maintain the level of false detections at
2.9× 10−7.
Shifting the detection boundary also impacts the
missed detection rate. This has two eﬀects in this ap-
plication. The ﬁrst is that aircraft stopping just over
the hold-short bar will be outside the detection bound-
ary and will therefore not be detected. This could be
considered as an advantage, as in reality, although the
aircraft will have violated procedure and entered the
protected zone, it will pose no risk to the ownship in
take-oﬀ or landing. In fact, a rejected take-oﬀ or land-
ing, in this case, would be unnecessary and triggering
an alert in such circumstances could be more detri-
mental to safety. In this respect, therefore, shifting of
the detection boundary is considered advantageous.
The second eﬀect of shifting the boundary is that
of eﬀectively delaying the alert in the classical run-
way incursion case where an aircraft continues onto
the runway. Introducing a delay in the alerting of a
runway incursion is detrimental to the eﬀectiveness of
mitigating runway conﬂicts. Indeed, early warning is
fundamental in this application where a few seconds
could make the critical diﬀerence in the outcome of
the conﬂict. The delay introduced by the threshold
shift is best expressed as a percentage of the leeway
available from when the aircraft crosses the hold-short
bar to when it arrives at the runway shoulder, which
is eﬀectively a measure of the early warning given be-
fore the physical conﬂict actually occurs. To quantify
this numerically, a typical airﬁeld layout can be con-
sidered, where the perpendicular distance between the
hold-short bar and the runway shoulder is 50m [6].
If position reporting accuracy is in the order of 6.5m
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RMS, as is typical to GPS-derived ADS-B data in an
all-satellites-in-view condition, a σpy of 6.5m can be
deﬁned [7, 8]. In this case, the 5σpy margin by which
the protected zone boundary would be shifted is 32m.
This gives a 65% decrease in early warning from when
an aircraft is detected to have crossed the hold-short
bar until it arrives at the runway shoulder. In terms
of time delay, if the aircraft is assumed to be taxi-
ing at a speed of 15m/s (30kts), the delay introduced
will be of the order of 2s. From this analysis, the im-
pact of ADS-B (or similar) traﬃc reporting accuracy
on the performance of conﬂcit detection and alerting
becomes evident. In fact, in the case where traﬃc
reporting accuracy is higher, such as through data fu-
sion and ﬁltering techniques, a signiﬁcant reduction
in this delay is seen. For instance for ADS-B data
based on diﬀerentially-computed GPS data, a σpy in
the order of 1m can be deﬁned [8]. In this case, the
margin by which the protected zone width would need
to be reduced to ensure the same false detection rate
is approximately 6-fold lower (5m). This would de-
lay early warning by approximately 10% (time delay
of 2s), rather than the 65% when using standard GPS
data.
Using a statistical software package, the eﬀect of
shifting the protected zone boundary on false detec-
tion was estimated for the range of shifts between 0σpy
and 6σpy . The delay introduced by the shift was also
estimated, assuming the aircraft approaches the hold
short bar at 15m/s. Figure 3 shows the result of this
analysis. Figure 3(a) is applicable to the case were the
traﬃc data is reported with an accuracy of 1m RMS,
whilst Figure 3(b) is for the case where traﬃc data is
reported with an accuracy of 6.5m RMS. The critical
eﬀect of data accuracy on the performance of conﬂcit
detection and alerting is again made evident by these
ﬁgures.
3.1. Extending Early Detection
Basing the conﬂict detection and alerting algorithm
on the presence or otherwise of traﬃc in the protected
zone is a straight forward, eﬀective and reliable tech-
nique for detecting runway conﬂicts. However, in criti-
cal situations where the conﬂict dynamics are marginal
with little time to react, earlier detection would be
beneﬁcial towards successful conﬂict mitigation. This
is more evident in the case where the uncertainity asso-
ciated with traﬃc reports is large, shrinking the early
detection margin as a trade-oﬀ for false alerts. A typ-
ical context is one where the ownship will be in the
advanced stage of the take-oﬀ run and an intruder
enters the runway such that there is insuﬃcient dis-
tance remaining for the ownship to safely clear the
conﬂict or to stop in time (cannot-go/cannot-stop sit-
uation). In these circumstances, early detection could
result in the ownship being able to stop or, at the
very least, reduce the impact speed in the case of a
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(b) When using position estimates with σpy = 6.5m.
Figure 3. Trade-oﬀ between the false detection rate
and the delay in conﬂict detection, introduced by shift-
ing the protected zone (conﬂict) boundary position
from the hold-short bar (closer towards the runway).
collision. Early detection can be achieved when the
intruder approaching the hold-short bar is travelling
at a relatively high taxi speed, as it will be evident
that the aircraft will not stop before the hold-short
bar, well before it crosses it. Indeed early detection is
most useful in these cases, as at high taxi speeds, the
time from crossing the hold-short bar to entering the
runway will be short (approximately 3s for an aircraft
travelling at 15m/s and a hold short bar positioned
at 50m from the runway shoulder). In circumstances
where the aircraft approaches the hold-short bar at low
speeds, or is stationary at the hold-short bar and starts
moving towards the runway, it will not be possible to
predict the intentions of the aircraft with conﬁdence
any signiﬁcant time before it crosses the bar. Fortu-
nately the long time (in the order of 20s) until the
aircraft enters the runway reduces the need for early
(pre-emptive) alerting in these cases.
To take advantage of this concept of pre-emptive
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alerting, a prediction (or look-ahead) of the states of
the aircraft approaching the hold-short bar needs to
be performed. The technique is that of monitoring the
aircraft speed proﬁle as it approaches the hold-short
bar and determining whether it can be expected to
stop before the bar or otherwise. The challenge here
is how to ascertain with conﬁdence that the aircraft
approaching the hold-short bar does not have the in-
tention to stop. This is necessary as to keep the level
of false detections at an acceptably low rate.
The aircraft deceleration d could be expressed in
terms of partial derivatives:
d =
∂Vg
∂t
=
(
∂s
∂t
)(
∂Vg
∂s
)
= Vg
(
∂Vg
∂s
)
(2)
where Vg is the ground speed and s is the distance
travelled. At low speeds, aircraft deceleration can be
assumed to be primarily aﬀected by braking force and
therefore constant with respect to Vg. The distance SB
an aircraft or vehicle will travel from an initial velocity
VB until it comes to rest will then be:
SB =
∣∣∣∣
∫ 0
VB
Vg
d
δV
∣∣∣∣ = V
2
B
2d
(3)
Since what is of interest is determining whether an
aircraft approaching the hold-short bar can be ex-
pected to stop in time or otherwise, a speed proﬁle
deﬁning the maximum braking that can reasonably be
expected of an aircraft with the intention to stop at the
hold-short bar is identiﬁed. This is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. The early detection braking proﬁle limit.
Aircraft above the limit cannot stop before reaching
the hold-short bar and therefore an alert can be trig-
gered earlier.
Aircraft beyond this limit can be expected to not
have the intention to stop before reaching the bar, al-
lowing early detection of the conﬂict. Conversely, for
aircraft in the region below this limit, it cannot be
ascertained whether the aircraft will be stopping or
otherwise and therefore no early warning of a conﬂict
can be provided in such cases. The value chosen for
the maximum expected deceleration dmax controls the
sensitivity of the prediction and needs to be set to pro-
vide an adequate balance between false and missed de-
tections. Large values of dmax, close to the aircraft’s
maximum braking capability would essentially delay
the generation of an early warning. This, in eﬀect,
would ensure that aircraft approaching the hold-short
bar, realising only at the latest instance that a run-
way incursion was about to be caused, thereby braking
heavily to stop in time, would correctly not generate
a false alert. However, in the normal incursion case,
where aircraft would be proceeding without the inten-
tion to stop, the early warning eﬀect is compromised
as shown in Figure 5. In this context, it is reasonable
to capture aircraft with a somewhat higher decelera-
tion rate than what would normally be expected when
approaching the hold-short bar, whilst it is deemed
unnecessary to cater for the event of crews becoming
aware of causing a runway incursion so late as to neces-
sitate emergency braking to stop before the hold-short
bar. Although the rate of occurrence of such an event
cannot be quantiﬁed statistically, the authors are of
the opinion that the risk of false alarms generated by
such events should be acceptable.
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Figure 5. Graph showing the eﬀect of choice of maxi-
mum braking proﬁle on early warning.
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In this context, therefore, it is appropriate to iden-
tify the maximum braking dmax that would be ex-
pected in normal braking behaviour on approaching
a hold-short bar and then add an extra leeway to mit-
igate the risk of false detections. In an experiment con-
ducted by NASA to model aircraft trajectories on the
airport surface [9], the maximum decelerations mea-
sured were of the order of −0.25m/s2 when travel-
ling in a straight line. These results were consistent
across diﬀerent types of aircraft, including narrow,
wide-bodied and regional aircraft. In fact, the experi-
ments also showed that pilots typically apply hardest
braking when decelerating from higher velocities (of
the order of −0.25m/s2 when at 15m/s), rather than
when decelerating from low velocities. Therefore, set-
ting dmax of −0.5m/s2 should ensure an adequate rep-
resentation of the typical maximum deceleration ex-
pected when approaching a hold-short bar. This value
was consequently use for this analysis.
3.1.1. Uncertainties due to Speed and Position
Errors
The reliable prediction of whether an aircraft can
stop before crossing the hold-short bar requires an
analysis of the uncertainties involved in performing
the calculation. This is dependent on both the un-
certainty in the aircraft speed VB as it approaches the
hold-short bar, as well as on the uncertainty in its po-
sition. In fact, due to the dependency of the braking
distance on the aircraft velocity, the uncertainty with
which the braking distance can be determined is ve-
locity dependent. These two eﬀects can be depicted
graphically in Figure 6.
The extent of the eﬀect of this uncertainty can be
determined through analyses. Referring to Figure 6,
the worst case eﬀect occurs when the reported aircraft
position is on the limit of acceptable braking that will
allow it to stop at the hold-short bar. Due to un-
certainties in actual aircraft position and velocity, a
probability density function exists about the reported
state, as shown in the ﬁgure. Approximately half the
combinations of actual speed and position will clearly
allow the aircraft to stop in time. However, the re-
mainder of the combinations will result in the aircraft
overrunning the hold-short bar. This is graphically ex-
pressed by the probability density function C. In order
to limit the eﬀect of false warnings, the displacement
of the protected zone threshold away from the hold-
short bar is advantageous, as can be seen in the ﬁgure.
What is necessary here is to ensure that the threshold
is beyond the 5σ tail of distribution C, in order to re-
duce the probability of false detections to a level of the
order of 10−7. Clearly, the probability of an aircraft
actually reporting its state to be on the limit braking
proﬁle is also low and this further reduces the overall
probability of false detections due to such an event.
The shifting of the threshold away from the hold-
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Figure 6. The eﬀect of uncertainties on the estimate of
the braking distance. A, B and C are the probability
density functions of the velocity error, positional error
and stopping point respectively.
short bar also has the eﬀect of displacing the braking
proﬁle limit to the right as shown in Figure 7. In
this context, it is then necessary to ensure that all but
only a few instances in 107 occurrences of the density
function fall within the displaced proﬁle to ensure the
target low false detection rate. The overall eﬀect of
this consideration, is once again that, of reducing the
eﬀectiveness of the early warning concept. This can
be seen in Figure 7 and comparing it with Figure 6.
Following the above discussion, it is relevant to
quantify the extent of the displacement in the brak-
ing proﬁle required to ensure satisfactory operation.
Referring to Figure 6, the expected braking distance
of the aircraft is given by:
SB =
V 2B
2|dmax| (4)
where VB is the velocity at which braking starts and
dmax is the maximum expected braking deceleration
of −0.5m/s2.
In the general case, assuming the taxiway is not per-
pendicular to the runway, VB needs to be considered
as the vector sum of the components in the X and Y
directions. Hence,
SB =
V 2Bx + V
2
By
2|dmax| (5)
where VBx and VBy have Gaussian distributed errors
with variances σ2vx and σ
2
vy respectively. However, the
actual distance travelled by which the aircraft can be
expected to come to rest from the reported position
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Figure 7. Shifting of the braking limit to reduce false
detections. This also has the eﬀect of reducing the
eﬀectiveness of the early warning concept.
must also include the error in the reported position:
S′B =
V 2Bx + V
2
By
2|dmax| +
√
2dx + 
2
dy (6)
where dx is the error in the X direction, being Gaus-
sian distributed with σpx and dy is the error in the Y
direction, being normally distributed with σpy .
With these considerations, the variance σ2B of the
actual braking distance S′B (i.e. the variance of distri-
bution C in Figure 6), can be expressed by applying a
ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation of the statisti-
cal moments:
σ2B =
(
∂S′B
∂VBx
σvx
)2
+
(
∂S′B
∂VBy
σvy
)2
. . .
+
(
∂S′B
∂dx
σpx
)2
+
(
∂S′B
∂dy
σpy
)2
(7)
Therefore, taking partial derivatives on Eq. (6)
gives:
σ2B =
V 2Bxσ
2
vx + V
2
By
σ2vy
d2max
+
2dxσ
2
px + 
2
dyσ
2
py
2dx + 
2
dy
(8)
The ﬁrst-order approximation to σB is only accurate
when S′B is much larger than the measurement noise;
that is when the aircraft is travelling at high taxi
speeds and is therefore still far away from the hold-
short bar. This is due to the fact that the approx-
imation of the complex error distribution of S′B to a
Gaussian function becomes less valid when close to the
measurement noise.
In the cases where the taxiways are perpendicular
to the runway, the aircraft approaching the hold-short
bar only travels in the Y direction, with its velocity
also aligned to this direction. Eq. (6) will then be
simpliﬁed, by setting VBx and dx to zero, reducing it
to:
S′B =
V 2By
2|dmax| + dy (9)
and its variance to:
σ2B =
(
VByσvy
dmax
)2
+ σ2py (10)
In order to gain conﬁdence in the assumptions made
in deriving Eqs. (8) and (10), a Monte-Carlo simu-
lation with 10,000 runs was carried out and the re-
sults correlated with the analytical derived counter-
parts. For this purpose two scenarios were simulated,
one with the aircraft approaching the hold-short bar
along a taxiway perpendicular to the runway and one
with the aircraft approaching on a taxiway at 45◦ to
the runway. For each scenario, a range of maximum
deceleration proﬁles were applied and the uncertainties
in the position and velocity estimates used are repre-
sentative of those in diﬀerential-GPS-derived ADS-B
data. The two sets of results correlated well for both
scenarios, as evident in Figures 8(a) and 8(b). The
only discrepancy observed is at low speeds in the 45◦
taxiway scenario. This is due to the ﬁrst-order Tay-
lor series approximation taken when deriving Eq. (8),
where the higher order terms of interaction between
the variables are not considered when estimating σB ,
resulting in Eq. (8) giving a slight over-estimate to σB .
This eﬀect appears only at low speed when the values
of VBx and VBy are close to the measurement noise
σvx and σvy . Furthermore, this eﬀect is not present
in the case where the taxiway is perpendicular to the
runway because σB calculated using Eq. (10) involves
less interaction of variables.
It is also interesting to take further inference from
Figure 8. The ﬁgures show that the standard deviation
in the overall distance covered σB (and therefore the
uncertainty in the early prediction) increases with ve-
locity. This is as expected because errors in higher ve-
locities will result in a larger eﬀect on braking distance
than the same error at lower velocities. The maximum
expected deceleration dmax also has an impact on this
uncertainty, with low decelerations contributing more
to the uncertainty. This is again as expected since
with low decelerations, the errors in velocity result in
a greater eﬀect on the overall distance covered than
when the aircraft decelerates quicker.
As previously discussed, maintaining a low false de-
tection rate necessitates displacing the braking proﬁle
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Figure 8. Variation of the standard deviation of brak-
ing distance σB with aircraft velocity VB for vari-
ous values of deceleration dmax using analytical cal-
culations and Monte-Carlo simulations. Simulated ﬁl-
tered ADS-B data for the aircraft on the ground with
σpx = σpy = 1m, σvx = σvy = 0.30m/s.
limit towards the right, with a displacement of 5σB
giving a false detection rate of the order of 10−7. How-
ever, as described by Eq. (8) and shown in Figure 8,
σB is speed dependent, resulting in the displacement
of the braking proﬁle also being speed dependent. Fig-
ure 9 shows the results of a simulation performed to
demonstrate the shift in the boundary by 5σB . From
this it is evident that as the speed approaches zero and
therefore σB approaches σpy , the shift in the thresh-
old away from the hold-short bar becomes equivalent
to that without the early detection (as deﬁned at the
start of Section 3). The ﬁgure also shows that early de-
tection with a displaced threshold partially mitigates
the disadvantage of late detections (missed warnings)
brought about by the shift. Fortunately, it recovers the
events involving higher taxi speeds, which, in practice
form the major threat in the context. Indeed the unde-
tectable area involving lower speeds will be associated
with events where, although delayed, the detection of
the runway incursion (at the displaced threshold) will
still provide suﬃcient time for reaction before the air-
craft arrives at the runway shoulder.
Figure 9. Simulation of the detection boundaries with
and without early detection using σpx = σpy = 1m,
σvx = σvy = 0.30m/s and dmax = −0.5m/s2.
3.1.2. Quantifying the Early Detection Time
What is essentially of interest in early detection is
the time from when a conﬂict is identiﬁed to occur to
when it actually occurs; that is, how early the con-
ﬂict is detected. According to the technique described
above, a conﬂict is detected once the aircraft approach-
ing the hold-short bar arrives to a point where it can-
not be reasonably expected to stop short of it (that
is, it no longer remains within the typical maximum
deceleration envelope). In such circumstances the air-
craft will be expected to cause a runway incursion and
therefore it is reasonable to expect it to be taxiing at
a constant speed towards the hold short bar. With
this assumption, the early detection time tB is deﬁned
by the distance between the early detection point and
the hold-short bar, divided by the aircraft speed. The
former can be derived from Figure 10, where the inter-
section between the braking proﬁle boundary and the
aircraft proﬁle is the point where it is identiﬁed that
a conﬂict would occur and, therefore, the early detec-
tion could be triggered. tB can, therefore, be deﬁned
by Eq. (11), where S′B−5σm deﬁnes the distance from
the hold-short bar at which the early detection can be
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triggered.
tB =
S′B − 5σB
VB
(11)
Figure 11 shows the relation between tB and VB
with and without the 5σB leeway allowed to the brak-
ing proﬁle boundary. As expected, the 5σB leeway
delays the point at which it can be identiﬁed that a
conﬂict would occur and therefore reduces the early de-
tection time. However, even with the leeway in place,
aircraft travelling at high velocities, in the order of
15m/s, are expected to be identiﬁed as being in con-
ﬂict up to approximately 12s prior to their crossing
of the hold-short bar. As previously mentioned, air-
craft travelling slowly in the order of 3.5m/s, cannot
be detected to cross the hold-short bar earlier.
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Figure 10. Intersection between the aircraft constant
velocity trajectory (in this case at 10m/s) and the
braking proﬁle boundary. The early detection time
is given by the time required for the aircraft to travel
from the intersection point to the stop-bar.
4. A Case Study: The 2001 Milan-Linate Ac-
cident
The Linate accident is an interesting case study in
this context, as it may be considered as a critical case
scenario where the ownship (MD87) was in rotation
when it impacted the conﬂicting aircraft (Citation).
With the continued take-oﬀ option clearly not having
been viable, the MD87 could only have attempted to
stop to avert the collision. The animation of the colli-
sion dynamics presented with the accident report [10]
shows that the Citation jet reached the runway shoul-
der 20s before impact. At this time, the MD87 was
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Figure 11. Variation in the early detection time with
intruder approach velocity to the hold-short bar, with
and without the 5σB leeway allowed to the braking
proﬁle boundary with dmax = −0.5m/s2.
already at about 65kts (33m/s) and it would most cer-
tainty have managed to stop before the collision point,
were the pilots alerted of the incursion at that instant.
In addition, the protected zone width would have ex-
tended about 55m from the runway shoulder3, which,
due to the airﬁeld geometry, would have resulted in the
Citation aircraft taxiing for 80m from the moment it
would have eﬀectively penetrated the protected zone
to the runway shoulder (Figure 12). Unfortunately,
the Citation was not required to be equipped with
a Flight Data Recorder and, as a result, the precise
speed with which the aircraft was taxiing is unknown.
In the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that
the Citation must have been travelling at less than
10m/s since visibility was so poor. This would have
deﬁnitely provided a detection time of at least 8s, as
the Citation had a distance of approximately 80m to
travel before entering the runway. Even without giving
credit to the early detection technique described pre-
viously, this 8s detection time would have resulted in
the generation of an alert when the MD87 would have
been at around 80kts (41m/s) and still 1km from the
conﬂict point on the runway. This leeway would have
been amply suﬃcient for the collision to be prevented.
In the Linate accident the Citation entered the run-
way 20s before impact and taxied slowly across to pro-
ceed onto another taxiway. This would have aﬀorded
a minimum of 20s of prior warning. It is interesting
to consider a more critical condition where the aircraft
3Using the published runway width of 60m, the last hold short
bar is positioned at 60m from the runway edge. Allowing a with-
drawal of 5m of the protected zone to suppress false detections
positions the protected zone edge at 55m.
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Figure 12. Diagram showing distances associated
with the protected zone boundary superimposed on
a satelite image of the Milan Linate 18L/36R intersec-
tion with taxiway R6 as existent in December 2001.
Satellite image sourced from Google Earth.
will have just entered the runway to hit the oncoming
aircraft. For this purpose an analysis was made to esti-
mate how early a conﬂict could be detected before an
intruding aircraft reaches the runway shoulder. The
total detection time tt as a function of the conﬂicting
aircraft taxi speed can be caluclated as the sum of:
• The time ta from the moment the traﬃc is per-
ceived to penetrate the protected zone until the
moment it reaches the runway.
• The additional time tb aﬀorded by the early
detection technique that anticipates that traﬃc
will penetrate the protected zone.
Table 1 tabulates the values for ta, tb and tt for the
range of aircraft approach speeds Vy between 1m/s
and 15m/s using a nominal positioning of the edge of
the protected zone at 50m from the runway shoulder.
Two graphs are plotted in Figure 13, one estimating
the alerting time for the algorithm without early de-
tection (i.e. alerting only once the traﬃc will have
penetrated the protected zone) and the other showing
alerting times with early detection. This shows a min-
imum alert time of just below 15s and highlights the
eﬀectiveness of the early detection technique in pro-
viding additional early warning.
It is interesting to try to estimate the impact on the
outcome of the Linate scenario if an alert time of 14s
has been aﬀorded. Once again, using the animation of
the accident released with the investigation report, one
can identify that, with the collision occurring at 147kts
and a reported distance of 1447m from the start of run,
Table 1
Table of detection times for various traﬃc taxi speeds.
Vy(m/s) ta(s) tb(s) tt(s)
1 50.00 1.09 51.09
2 25.00 2.18 27.18
3 16.67 3.27 19.94
4 12.50 4.36 16.86
5 10.00 5.45 15.45
6 8.33 6.54 14.87
7 7.14 7.64 14.78
8 6.25 8.73 14.98
9 5.56 9.82 14.38
10 5.00 10.91 15.91
11 4.54 12.00 16.54
12 4.17 13.09 17.26
13 3.85 14.18 18.03
14 3.57 15.27 17.57
15 3.33 16.36 19.69
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Figure 13. Graph of total alert time tt as a function
of traﬃc taxi speed.
the MD87 was at about 96kts and 560m into the run
14s before impact. Assuming the alert was generated
at this moment and allowing for a crew reaction time
of 2s, the aircraft would have started to decelerate
at 106kts and 670m into the run. This means that
the aircraft will have had just over 770m in which to
stop and a collision would have been averted with an
average braking of 2m/s2, which should be achievable
in the right conditions4. Therefore it can be concluded
that even in such a critical scenario, early detection
4As a comparison, the A320 has three braking rates in automatic
braking mode. The deceleration limits in the three rates are:
low-1.7m/s2, medium-3m/s2 and high-maximum braking [11].
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would have indeed prevented the collision.
5. Conclusions
Whilst conﬂict detection based on the presence or
otherwise of traﬃc within the ownship’s protected zone
has shown to be a valid technique, the selection of
the conﬂcit detection threshold has seldomly been ad-
dressed in literature. Due to the need for high relia-
bility in the algorithm driving runway conﬂict alerts,
brought about by the safety critical nature of the ap-
plication, this work has given considerable attention
to the design of a technique which allows control of
the false and missed detection rates. This has been
achieved through a process of state uncertainty prop-
agation, which allows tuning of the conﬂict detection
boundaries such that the false and missed detection
rates can be controlled. In fact, by withdrawing the
detection threshold by approximately 5m from the
hold-short bar, a false detection rate below 10−7 could
be achieved without introducing a signiﬁcant delay in
conﬂict detection. Additionally, the concept of conﬂict
prediction has been developed, where, through moni-
toring of the conﬂicting aircraft’s speed proﬁle, it could
be determined with conﬁdence whether the aircraft
will stop before overrunning the hold-short bar. This is
achieved through the deﬁnition of a typical maximum
braking proﬁle, which, once exceeded, indicates that
the aircraft will not stop and will consequently over-
run the hold-short bar. These two tools provide the
basis for the development of a reliable on-board run-
way collision avoidance system. Of course, the actual
limits allowed on false detections requires futher con-
sideration through consultancy with the stakeholders,
including the certiﬁcation bodies.
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